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 Abstract 
Roger Kaspersons’s paper prompts us to reflect on whether traditional risk communication 
tools and approaches might be inadequate for many of the tasks now emerging. One can point 
to the increasingly complex nature of some technological and environmental hazards; the 
need to scrutinise emerging technologies upstream of significant applications; and 
fundamental changes to risk identities within society. Perhaps we now genuinely face a risk 
society, exemplified by the dysfunction of global financial systems, extreme inequalities and 
encroaching environmental threats, alongside the unwinding of traditional social identities? 
Strategic capacity to address many of these fundamental risk challenges is lacking.      
 
 
 
 
  
 Developments in risk communication since the mid-1980s have led to a genuinely 
international research and practitioner field which has blossomed in its empirical efforts, if 
not necessarily always in theoretical insight or clarity. In the UK significant policy and 
regulatory activity around risk governance and communication developed from about 1990 
onwards: the controversial birth in 1992 of the second edition of the UK Royal Society’s Risk 
Report, a volume eventually to become something of a best-seller for the Society; the 
regulatory work within government of the ‘ILGRA’ Intergovernmental Liaison Group on 
Risk Assessment; and several key research projects sponsored by the Health and Safety 
Executive including the 1999 workshop on social amplification of risk held at Cumberland 
Lodge (Pidgeon, Kasperson, Slovic, 2003). At about this time the UK and Europe saw a 
series of chronic failures of risk management and regulation, and in particular the BSE ‘mad 
cow’ crisis of the mid-1990s, the outcome of which would prompt even the UK House of 
Lords (2000) to advocate a more dialogic relationship between scientists and wider society, 
sentiments fully in keeping with the then developing thinking in risk communication practice.  
 
A quieter period for risk communication professionals followed the turn of the millennium, 
although the past 5 years have seen renewed high-level interest in the topic within both 
science and government policy circles in the UK as elsewhere. The ‘Climategate’ affair in 
late 2009 focused attention on what could be legitimately claimed about climate change and 
its attendant uncertainties and risks, the Icelandic volcanic ash cloud that grounded much of 
Northern European aviation in April 2010, the Fukushima nuclear disaster of course, but also 
a less well-known example of social amplification of risk when the UK press discovered that 
British ash trees had become infected with the Chalara pathogen (Pidgeon and Barnett, 2013). 
All of these recent events merited (without necessarily receiving) a robust, evidence-based 
risk communication response.  
 
For those of us working in this field it felt as if the phone-lines from the press, policymakers 
and scientific colleagues would never stop ringing. An erudite response to all of this renewed 
interest might be to simply state that risk communication is a mature field of study, we have 
been here several times (and decades) before, and that as a result proper guidance and tested 
methodologies in large measure already exist. Policy makers and risk practitioners could 
therefore do worse than make reference to the established literature on the subject. Roger 
Kasperson (this volume) rightly urges us to reject such complacency, and to take proper stock 
of the real lessons, both positive and less-so, learned over the thirty year period since risk 
communication first became a recognised field of inquiry.  
 
Several themes emerge from Kasperson’s characteristically perceptive analysis: that more 
than ever, risk communication practitioners need to recognise and accommodate the values of 
a diverse set of publics; that different forms of uncertainty may need careful analysis if we 
are to fully understand where to focus communication  and risk management efforts; that 
growing conditions of social distrust may signal a need to adopt more deliberative approaches 
with varied stakeholders and publics; and above all that effective risk communication 
programmes require persistence, long-term intellectual engagement and significant 
investment in technical capacity. All of these raise profound questions for our discipline as it 
moves forward into its next decade and beyond.   
 
Roger’s paper also prompts us also to reflect more deeply on why our traditional tools and 
methods might be inadequate for the tasks now emerging. Some technological and 
environmental hazards may well have become genuinely far more complex, and with this 
their risks more uncertain and unpredictable, making the possibility of unintended 
consequences and systemic accidents, to use Charles Perrow’s (1984) immortal phrase, more 
‘normal’ in their onset, consequences and frequency. Other manufactured risks are being 
closely scrutinised at a much earlier stage in their research and development histories, where 
uncertainties almost by definition abound, with technologies in effect being subject to 
assessment ‘upstream’ of significant or widespread application within society 
(nanotechnologies, global climate engineering, or synthetic biology risks to take just three). 
Finally, societies may themselves be changing in fundamental ways. Risks are never purely 
environmental or technological – they always involve people, communities, their 
organisations and sometimes (as at Fukushima Daiichi) the cultures of whole nations. Few 
would disagree that we are in a more globalised world, and one which holds fundamental 
implications for many aspects of both risk governance and the organisation of everyday life. 
Hence, it remains to be seen whether the decline in trust diagnosed by Kasperson represents 
simply an antecedent condition, to be addressed through devising and applying better 
discursive and deliberative processes, or a symptom of a far deeper set of trends? 
 
For my own part I would point to the recent book The Unwinding, a blend of narrative and 
contemporary history, where the social commentator George Packer (2013) describes how 
many of the taken for granted social contracts between citizens and institutions have been 
gradually unravelling in the USA over the past 30 years; in effect individualising 
responsibility for the risks faced in employment, personal finances, personal security and 
healthcare, and even social standing and status, for a very large sector of the American 
population. Similar contemporary trends could be identified in many other countries around 
the globe. This is, of course, Ulrich Beck’s (1992) risk society writ large, with privatization 
for individual harm sitting alongside an erosion of both trust and the social certainties that 
traditional identities (such as being a family member, employee, trade unionist, home owner) 
always brought us. Beck did not entirely foresee that the principle test of his thesis would 
come first in the USA and Britain, amidst the systemic collapse in 2008 of global systems 
and institutions of financialisation. And Packer’s thesis might be dismissed as simple 
narrative, were it not set alongside evidence also of growing inequalities in access to wealth 
in many nations, and to levels not seen since the advent of the First World War (Piketty, 
2014). Amidst all of this, one is prompted to ask whether complex and uncertain risks are 
indeed set to encroach further into modern everyday life over the coming decades? And 
financial crises, serious though they might be, should not serve to deflect our attention, or that 
of our elected politicians for that matter, from continued encroachment on the earth’s 
environmental and resources limits, the significant possibility of global climate disruption if 
we enter a 4 or 5 degree warming world, or of mega-technologies offering catastrophic and 
existential risks to global society.  
 
What is clear in all of this is that we lack fundamental strategic capacity (Pidgeon and 
Fischhoff, 2011) not only in ‘risk communication’ as framed in the traditional disciplines of 
decision and risk analysis, but in uncertainty assessment, in appropriate methods for situating 
‘values’ in public and stakeholder engagement, and in fostering citizen deliberation for the 
wider public good – several of the reasons why past intellectual progress is not seemingly 
matched by current practical action. Roger Kasperson’s paper should be taken as a light to 
illuminate a part of the rocky road that might very well lie ahead. It is also a challenge to risk 
communication researchers and practitioners to begin to grapple with some of the deep-seated 
problems that we will find along the way. 
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